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(1) In this lesson, we shall review ethics as explained in the Hindu school of Indian 
philosophy:  Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. Along with Vedānta, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is one of the two 
schools of Indian philosophy that is explicitly based on the Vedas. It is sometimes 
claimed that there are six schools of Indian philosophy (including Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, 
Yoga and Sāṅkhya along with Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta) and moreover that the 
commonality of these schools is that they accept the validity of the Vedas. However, this 
view is myth. Sāṅkhya and Yoga, for instance, does not explicitly refer to the Vedas. The 
schools certainly do not reject the Vedas—explicitly—but they do not recommend taking 
the content of these texts seriously. Vedānta in contrast is a philosophy articulated on the 
basis of the classic summary of the latter part of the Vedas: the Brahma Sūtra (Vedānta 
Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa. The guiding theme of this sutra is the topic of Brahman (the Great, 
Development) and Ātmā.  Similarly, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, is based on a classic commentary 
on the former part of the Vedas: the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra of Jaimani. The guiding theme of 
this sutra is action (karma)—not in the extended sense of consequences of actions 
(though this too is relevant) but in terms of the more basic question of appropriate 
behaviour.  
The Mīmāṃsā Sūtra is of special interest to those concerned with ethics, as it claims to be 
an explication of dharma or ethics. Problems in understanding the ethics of Mīmāṃsā can 
be avoided if we keep in view the basic matter of ethics: resolving the question of the 
priority of the right (procedure) and the good (outcome). This question leads to at least 
four possible answers:  
(i) Deontology: the right is justified independently from the good. 
(ii) Consequentialism: the good justifies the right (the end justifies the means).  
(iii) Virtue Theory: the good causes the right, such that any consequence of the good is 
also the right.  
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(iv) Bhakti Theory: the right causes the good, as the good is nothing but the practical 
realization of the regulative ideal of the good. We can call this 'bhakti' or 'devotion' 
theory because a devotion to a specific ideal yields the good.   
 
Curiously, while the actions that Pūrva Mīmāṃsā votaries recommend, and which are 
enjoined in the tradition based on the Vedas, make reference to various Gods, a standard 
view in this school is that taking the ethics of the Vedic tradition seriously does not entail 
a realism about gods. In fact, talk of gods can be deflated of their metaphysical content 
and understood solely as a matter of procedure (Bilimoria 1989, 1990). The classical 
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā authors are hence atheists. This is surprising, for Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is 
often depicted as the most orthodox of Hindu schools. But, philosophically, this is in 
keeping with Mīmāṃsā rejecting a Bhakti account of ethics, in favour of the 
proceduralism of Deontology.  
In the next section (2), we shall analyze and explain the elements of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 
Ethics. This sets the stage for (3) reviewing the central argument of the school. We shall 
see that more than one argument arises, and the total position is one of Moral Non 
Naturalism, albeit a Brahminical version. More importantly, it is a version of Moral 
Realism. We shall then proceed to (4) consider some objections, and (5) end with 
concluding remarks.  
The texts that we shall rely upon in our investigation are Jaimini’s Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (MS), 
Śabara’s commentary on this basic sutra (Śabara on MS), and Kumārila’s commentary on 
Śabara’s commentary called the Ślokavārtika (SV). 
2 Explication 
 
The Mīmāṃsā Sūtra begins with four concepts:  
 codana- = injunction; command 
 lakṣaṇa = definition; characteristic; attribute; sign; mark; indicator 
 artha = welfare, material prosperity, wealth, worldly success, value, goal 
 dharma = morality/ethics 
These are strung together in the introductory sutra I.i.2 that constitutes a mutual analysis 
of dharma and artha. Accordingly,  
 Ethics is a command that as a matter of definition yields benefit. 
More succinctly and abstractly, the right is defined as yielding the good.  
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This definition seems to be ambivalent. It is not a virtue ethics: it does not hold that the 
good brings about ethics. Does it support Deontology, Consequentialism or Bhakti?  
One reason that this account of dharma does not count as a version of Bhakti is that it is 
not committed to the strong claim that the right causes the good (Bhakti). It is committed 
to a weaker claim that the right is defined by the good. Consider the analogy: school is 
defined as what yields knowledge. It does not follow that attending school will yield 
knowledge. School does not cause knowledge. It is defined by knowledge. 
It is not obviously a version of Bhakti for another reason: Bhakti links a regulative ideal 
of the right with the outcome: the practice of the regulative idea is the good. We find this 
clearly defended in the Yoga Sūtra for instance, where Patañjali argues for the entire 
structure of yoga on the basis of conforming one’s practice to the ideal of Īśvara—the 
Lord. The Lord is a special kind of person (puruṣa-viśeṣa) who is untouched by past 
choices (karma) and afflictions (kleśa) (Yoga Sūtra I.24).  When the right is what 
conforms to the Lord, we bring about our own Lordliness, self-governance and freedom. 
One might be inclined to reject the suggestion that the Mīmāṃsā account of ethics is  
deontological because deontologists reject the connection between the right and the good. 
But this is a mistaken impression. Deontologists reject the idea that the right can be 
justified by the good. They do not reject that the right can be defined by its propensity to 
bring about the good. Indeed, most Deontologists, whether Kant, or Krishna when 
commenting on Karma Yoga in the Gītā, affirm that dharma is the kind of thing that as a 
matter of definition brings about good outcomes. Deontologists however reject the 
proposition that the good can be used as a justification for duty. The reason? For while it 
might be true that in general, duty brings about the good, it does not follow that in every 
case of the performance of duty, that good results. It may be generally advisable to tell 
the truth because good things happen when you do. But it does not follow that in every 
case that we tell the truth, good things happen. If we have a duty toward honesty, then it 
would seem we should not lie, even when lying would result in a good outcome.  
So the definition of ethics from the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra is consistent with Deontology. Ethics 
being defined as what brings about benefit is not the same as the claim that benefit or the 
good justifies the right—the latter claim is Consequentialism. As this latter claim seems 
absent from the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, we can exclude Consequentialism.  But there is ample 
evidence that Consequentialism is not only not the Mīmāṃsā ethics, but that it is the 
target of their ethics.  
Consider the commentary on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra by Śabara:  
... Dharma, however, is something that is yet to come, and 
it does not exist at the time that it is to be known; while 
sense perception is the apprehending of an object that is 
actually present and not non-existent at the time (of 
cognition);—hence sense-perception cannot be the means 
(of knowing) dharma". (Śabara on MS I.i.4 p.8) 
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This passage depicts ethics as a concern for something that cannot be known in terms of 
outcomes. Ethics so depicted is not about the good but about the right. This is 
Deontology: our justification for the right has nothing to do with the good.  
2.1 How to know Ethics 
How do we ever come to know what ethics is? If experience cannot yield knowledge of 
ethics, then it must be something non-sensible. Our non-sensible means of knowledge is 
representational. When we comprehend representations, we do not experience their 
content: rather, the representation mediates our awareness of such content. The content of 
such representations may be true or false. Being systematic or critical about such 
representations is a way to get to knowledge via non-empirical means.  
According to the Nyāya school, as represented by the Mīmāṃsā school, the meaning of 
words is non-eternal because (NS II.ii.13): 
Word is a product (non-eternal) because it is seen to follow 
(after effort) ... because it does not persist ... because there 
is simultaneity (of the perception of the word) in diverse 
places ... because there are original forms and 
modifications ... [and because] there is an augmentation for 
the word (sound) due to the multiplicity of its producers 
(speakers). (MS I.i.6-11) 
Here, the Nyāya view appears to be confusing the experienced character of a 
representation with its content. The content transcends the experience of the 
representation according to Śabara:  
... the word is manifested (not produced ) by human effort; 
that is to say, if, before being pronounced, the word was not 
manifest, it becomes manifested by the effort (or 
pronouncing). Thus it is found that the fact of words being 
'seen after effort' is equally compatible with both views.... 
The Word must be eternal;—why?—because its utterance 
is for the purpose of another.... If the word ceased to exist 
as soon as uttered then no one could speak of anything to 
others .... Whenever the word 'go' (cow) is uttered, there is 
a notion of all cows simultaneously. From this it follows 
that the word denotes the Class. And it is not possible to 
create the relation of the Word to a Class; because in 
creating the relation, the creator would have to lay down 
the relation by pointing to the Class; and without actually 
using the word 'go' (which he could not use before he has 
laid down its relation to its denotation) in what manner 
could he point to the distinct class denoted by the word 
'go'.... (Śabara on MS I.i.12-19 pp.33-38) 
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In philosophy, the idea that categories or meaning is eternal or transcendent of their 
representations is often known as Realism about Universals, or Platonism, after Plato 
who apparently was the first to defend this theory. The famous Mīmāṃsā author 
Kumārila thinks that this Platonistic conception of language provides the model for 
understanding how the Vedas are independently valid:  
Vedic assertions are not false—because in regard to their 
own signification, they are independent of the speaker—
like the notions of the word and its denotation. Or, Ideas 
originating in the Vedas are true—because they arise from 
sentences that are eternal—like the signification of a 
sentence. (SV V.xi.1) 
All words are independent of their speaker if the meaning of the words are Platonistic. So 
if Vedic assertions are not false because of their eternal meaning, then all assertions are 
like this. But this is not quite Kumārila’s point. Kumārila is introducing a distinction 
between two differing kinds of word usage. The first is context bound and characterizes 
everyday language use. Here, what we refer to is transient, and this transience is a 
function of our contextual usage. But the meaning of Vedic injunctions in context 
transcend them: they are not about what we are doing at any time or what we are 
referring to in our present case, but real in all contexts. The reason is that their 
significance does not arise from our social interactions; that is why their meaning can be 
independent of the speaker. As such, they are true in the way that mathematical formula 
are true: as prescriptions on how to organize and evaluate life.  
Does it follow from these assertions that only the Vedas are a source of knowledge of 
ethics?  Here a distinction is drawn between the source of moral knowledge, and what we 
can consult for moral knowledge. All moral knowledge is based on śruti: context 
independent, eternal knowledge. But there can also be a memory or tradition based 
around this: smṛti. If our traditions do not conflict with śruti, we may follow them (MS 
I.iii.2), and in cases where the two conflict, śruti takes precedence (MS I.iii.3).  We could 
call this theory of moral epistemology 'Vedic Foundationalism.' It is a view shared by the 
Orthodox Vedānta schools and the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school.  
2.2 Internal Criticism 
According to the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, unethical acts are those that are intended to produce 
harm against other human beings; they involve the 'inflicting of injury, and the inflicting 
of injury has been forbidden' (Śabara on MS I.i.2 p.7). To inflict injury is to fail to 
maximize benefit (artha). Thus, on Śabara’s reading, ethics is identical with that which 
promotes the well-being of people in general.  This is in keeping with MS I.i.2, which 
defines ethics as that which brings about benefit. He notes that the Vedas do mention 
some actions that are divisive and harmful, but these are not prescribed, merely referred 
to (Śabara on MS I.i.2 p.7). 
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What then of injury to beings such as animals, whose slaughter is prescribed by Vedic 
practice? Animal sacrifice is an ancient portion of Vedic ritual. If the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā 
apologist wants to defend the Vedic tradition, it would seem that they have to own up to 
such immoral actions. Yet, this is not the Mīmāṃsā position: 'He who would attribute 
sinfulness even to the enjoined ... on the ground of its being a "Slaughter", like any 
ordinary slaughter (outside a sacrifice), would be courting a contradiction of the 
Scriptures' (SV II.273-274).  Kumārila’s response is that as the Vedas are our source of 
knowledge of dharma, we are not in a position to object to its prescriptions.  '...[F]or the 
comprehension of Dharma and Adharma, there is no other means save the fact of their 
being enjoined and prohibited (respectively) [by the Vedas]' (SV II.242-43). According to 
Kumārila , the Vedas do not assert 'any sinfulness ... in connection with such slaughter ... 
nor is such (sinful character) to be assumed (in the case of such slaughter) through other 
prohibitions ...' (SV II.261-62). He concludes from these observations that 'sinfulness 
belongs to only that slaughter which does not form part of a sacrifice' (SV II.265). In the 
case of slaughter not enjoined by scripture, 'the disgust that we feel is only based upon 
the prohibitive scriptural texts' (SV II.234). 
In short, our moral sensibility is ultimately derived from the Vedas. So when we 
psychologically object to something, we do it by virtue of the influence of the Vedas. 
There is no independent means of moral knowledge.  
2.3 Anti-Naturalism 
We have noted that Śabara argues that knowledge of ethics cannot be reduced to 
knowledge of the good. The good consists of outcomes. Outcomes are what we 
experience, yet ethics is about the future. So in so far as we are interested in ethics, we 
are interested in what cannot be experienced: the future. Thus ethics must be understood 
procedurally. This is Deontology.  
Kumārila provides the following further argument for Deontology.  
For the comprehension of Dharma and Adharma, there is 
no other means save the fact of their being enjoined and 
prohibited (respectively). Hence the introduction of an 
inferential argument in this connection is not proper. For 
those who declare Dharma to be due to helping others to 
happiness, and Adharma to be due to causing pain to others 
... though with qualms of conscience, if he has intercourse 
with his preceptor's wife, he would be incurring a great 
Dharma, because thereby he would be conferring a great 
benefit of happiness to the woman.... And further, he who 
would ascertain (the character of) Adharma independently 
of Scriptural prohibitions, would land himself on 'Mutual 
Dependency'—in as much as he would be attributing 
sinfulness to pain, and pain again to sinfulness. (SV II.242-
47) 
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There are two aspects to this argument. The first is what is called the reductio ad 
absurdum: the reduction to absurdity of the contrasting view to Deontology: 
Consequentialism. Consequentialists claim that ethical choice is justified by the outcome. 
If this is true, then beneficial outcomes should justify actions. Beneficial outcomes 
include pleasure and happiness. The idea that pleasure or happiness is the chief outcome 
for ethical choice is known as Utilitarianism. According to Kumārila, this view implies 
that we should undertake actions that break bonds of trust and loyalty, but this would be 
wrong, just as sleeping with your teacher’s partner would be wrong.  This shows that 
Consequentialism is wrong. If we have only two options—Deontology or 
Consequentialism—this reduction via disjunctive syllogism (p or q, not p therefore q) 
shows that Deontology is preferable. 
The second aspect of this passage is the idea of 'mutual dependency.' This criticism 
claims that there is a circularity involved in identifying dharma, or the ethical, with a 
natural property such as happiness or pleasure. The problem is that both ideas end up 
informing the other. Why is this mutual dependency wrong?  
Western moralists have wrestled with this question. G.E. Moore famously argued that 
naturalistic accounts of the good that defined goodness in terms of naturalistic properties 
such as happiness fail to provide a definitive explanation of why the thing so defined is 
good. This is his Open Question Argument. Indeed, on Moore’s account, any definition 
that tries to reduce goodness to some set of properties will have the problem of not being 
able to explain why the thing so named is good (Moore 1903, 14-15). Moore’s critics 
have argued that if the Open Question Argument is correct, no account of goodness could 
suffice. But here Kumārila seems to agree with Moore because the Vedas, as something 
Non Natural and eternal—explain goodness.  Renaming 'happiness' as the 'good' or 
'dharma' provides no explanation. But linking an action to the Vedas does. By analogy, it 
is like the difference between merely renaming some particle in reality 'the explanation,' 
and linking the particle to a theory or body of knowledge. The former approach is 
explanatorily bankrupt, but the latter has ideas and principles to offer as an explanation.  
Kumārila and Moore seem to agree that calling happiness 'ethical' is merely an act of 
renaming and not of explanation.  
2.3.1 Who is entitled to practice Ethics? 
A peculiar feature of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā ethics is that very few people are entitled to or 
able to practice ethics on its account.  To the question 'Who then is entitled?' the answer 
is 'Only one who is able to carry out the whole act' according to Śabara. And in his view, 
what counts as being able to carry out the whole act is being able to produce happiness 
from the action. Animals and anything else that cannot see an act of sacrifice to fruition 
are not entitled to practice ethics.  Moreover, as they have not studied the Vedas, they 
lack knowledge of ethics.  Deities too cannot practice ethics in so far as the duties of ethic 
include sacrifices to the Gods, and such Gods have no one to sacrifice to (Śabara on MS 
IV.i.5 pp.973-974) 
Amongst humans, not all can sacrifice either. The śūdra or labour caste is not eligible, for 
its members are not thought to be qualified to study the Vedas (MS, IV.i.26). But even 
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among those who can study the Vedas, not all are allowed. According to Śabara, Sages, 
who are the head of Brahmanic lineages (gotra), are not eligible to perform sacrifices, for 
they themselves lack a lineage (Śabara on MS IV.i.5 p.973), a prerequisite for sacrificial 
performances. Yet, we find according to MS IV.i.8, women are as entitled to perform 
sacrifices as men. Commenting on this sūtra, Śabara writes: 'It is not true that man alone 
is entitled to perform sacrifices; in fact, Bādarāyaṇa [an authority in the tradition and 
named author of the Vedānta Sutra] has held that "the whole genus" is entitled .... From 
all this it follows that women also should be regarded as entitled to perform sacrifices 
because the genus [of eligibility to perform sacrifices] is equally present in all' ( Śabara 
on MS IV.i.8 pp.977-978).   
3 Main Argument 
This argument goes from the analysis of ethics, to the Brahmanism that ties ethics to the 
Vedas. The analysis of ethics (the first premise) in and of itself is controversial. The 
second and third premises are linked: If one grants the second, then the third follows. 
Together the argument is valid. But is it sound? Those who disagree could take aim at the 
second premise.  
The Mīmāṃsā defense of the second premise might look as follows (the second premise 
reappears here as Premise 4): 
Premise 1. The only way to know about ethics is from śruti (context independent 
truth). 
Premise 2. Tradition based on and consistent with śruti is permissible as it derives 
from śruti. (MS I.iii.2) 
Premise 3. The common theme of śruti is the good that comes of ethics.  
Therefore  Ethics is a command defined by its good yielding properties (MS I.i.2) 
Premise 4 and 5 are linked: if 4 is true, 5 follows. The conclusion is the basic claim of the 
Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. To get to it, from 4 and 5, one requires premise 6 to fill the gap. If 
premise 6 is true, then the good yielding properties of ethics are prescribed by the Vedas.   
What is the reason for believing premise 6? It is Vedic Non Naturalism. Natural accounts 
of moral terms are fraught with question begging circularity. They are mere re-namings 
of a natural property with a moral term, and provide no non-circular explanation. The 
Vedas in contrast constitute independent evidence about what yields goodness. As the 
naturalistic account is a failure, there is no independent means of discerning the good 
(artha) apart from ethics as prescribed in the Vedas.  
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4 Objections and Concerns regarding the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā  
4.1 Methodological Objection 
According to one objection, the tradition of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā scholarship is not ethics or 
moral philosophy. It is a semi-legalistic tradition focused on conflicts and variations in 
customary law as set out in smṛti texts such as the dharmaśāstras, which claim to be 
based on the Vedas. These are largely high caste texts dealing with ritual purity and the 
maintenance of social inequality(cf. Kane 1990). All of this shows that the Pūrva 
Mīmāṃsā is unethical in two respects. First, it promotes values of inequality and 
discrimination based on birth, and it is patently cruel in the case of its contempt for 
animals as fodder for sacrifices. Second, ethics is a species of philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā 
semi-legal concern for customary law and policy is not philosophy.  
This objection is based on overwhelming evidence: the bulk of writing attributed to the 
Pūrva Mīmāṃsā tradition. Indeed, even the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra that begins on a 
philosophical note quickly descends into minutia of the Vedic ritual, which is far 
removed from what most regard as ethical.  
But the idea that Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is not ethics for it is not philosophical ignores its 
trenchant arguments. The idea that Mīmāṃsā cannot be ethics because its values are not 
ethical is to confuse in what way any theory in moral philosophy counts as a theory of 
ethics with a biased, substantive appraisal of such a theory. Any theory of ethics counts 
as ethics not because it is true, but merely because it is a position on the relative priority 
of the right and the good. It may be mistaken, but this does not prevent it from counting 
as a theory of ethics, any more than an incorrect theory of metaphysics may count as a 
theory of metaphysics.  
More importantly, to decide that the Mīmāṃsā ethics is not an ethic because it 
contravenes our moral values is to beg the question about moral values—it is to assume 
our theory of ethics as the premise on the basis of which we draw conclusions about what 
can be ethics and what cannot: only our own values would end up being vindicated by 
such an approach.  
4.2 Philosophical Objection 
A philosophical problem with the Mīmāṃsā view is its easy conflation of Veda and śruti. 
These terms are used interchangeably. But they are not the same concept. The Vedas 
form an idealized corpus: a body of text. Śruti is the idea of timeless, context 
transcendent, truth of philosophical importance. The arguments for the primacy of śruti 
over smṛti may survive philosophical scrutiny. It does not follow that the Vedas really are 
śruti.  
This leads us to question the criterion of śruti. Kumārila elaborates. On his account, 
śruti’s significance is not transient—context bound. Śruti hence can be distinguished 
from the transactions we have in contexts: these are tied to our interlocution. Any text, 
though, that is not a matter of interlocution (conversations that we have together within a 
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context), would thus be śruti on this account. On this account of śruti, I could make my 
own śruti up, and leave it in a printed form for all to find, or perhaps published 
anonymously on the internet. It is not easy to remove something once it is on the internet: 
it would seem to have a timeless life, independent of particular contexts of interpersonal 
interaction and transaction. If context transcendent truth is the basis of moral knowledge, 
and if all this consists in claims that are context independent, everyone would have to 
follow my śruti. This is absurd. Merely being context independent is not sufficient for 
śruti.   
One failed response on the part of the Mīmāṃsā School is to claim that there is some 
kind of independent verification of the Vedas being śruti, which is not available to every 
context independent text. Yet, this is what is rejected by the Mīmāṃsā School, as it 
undermines the primacy of the Vedas.  
Another failed response is that Veda is real śruti because it is traditional, but Moral 
Propaganda written today and published on the internet is not. Problem: The Mīmāṃsā 
view is that tradition gains its legitimacy from śruti, not the other way around. So the 
Vedas cannot be defended on the grounds of their being traditional. A Philosophical 
option open to the Mīmāṃsā is to hence disentangle the content of the Indian Vedas from 
the philosophical idea of śruti as context independent sentences and theory on 
philosophical matters.  These are intuitive truths. The Mīmāṃsā authors would have 
grounds for maintaining that ethics rests on śruti. This would be a form of moral 
rationalism where the source of ethical knowledge is not experience, but rational 
intuition. Traditionalists might reject this approach, but the identification of śruti as the 
foundation of smṛti is a latent criticism of conservativism: tradition comes second and is 
not self-justifying.  
5 Conclusion 
The case of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā ethics is not unlike the metaphysics of the Vedānta tradition. 
It is true that the metaphysics of the Vedānta tradition is based in some way on the 
Upanishads. But it does not follow that the theory of metaphysics that we find Vedānta 
authors defend is merely a directive: see Upaniṣads. Rather the theories are typically 
backed up with arguments that aspire to be philosophical. Here too in the case of Pūrva 
Mīmāṃsā, the ethics is not merely a pointer to the Vedas. It is the more radical thesis: 
defer to what is context transcendent to discern what produces the good and employ this 
in one’s criticism and justification of tradition. Put this way, the Mīmāṃsā ethics is not 
conservative.  
As we have seen, the bulk of the Mīmāṃsā tradition consists in the identification of the 
Veda with the category of śruti (timeless, context independent truth) and on this basis 
constitutes fodder for the articulation of a high caste world view. This yields a 
substantive outlook that is biased towards the culture and interest of high caste 
individuals. But if this identification of śruti with the Vedas is without merit, we might 
look back upon the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā for its strengths: an argument for moral non-
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naturalism and moral realism. The basic themes of this system are summed up in the 
argument:  
Premise 1. Ethics is a command defined by its good yielding properties (MS I.i.2) 
Premise 1. The only way to know about ethics is from śruti (context independent 
truth). 
Premise 2. Tradition based on and consistent with śruti is permissible as it   
  derives from śruti.  
Therefore  Ethics, is about śruti.  
This philosophical essence of the position is purged of the bias towards high caste issues, 
and something that people could get behind regardless of their social context. The big 
question of course is what counts as context independent truth. We seem to need to look 
beyond Pūrva Mīmāṃsā for a satisfactory answer to this question so that the tradition of 
some people (the Vedas) is not confused with timeless truth.  
  
